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Straightening Out Strougo: The
Maryland Legislative Response to
Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens &
Clark, Inc.
James J. Hanks, Jr.*
In May 1997, Senior United States District Judge
Robert W. Sweet ignited a firestorm in the investment
company world with his holding in Strougo v. Scudder,
Stevens & Clark, Inc.l that, under Maryland law, receipt of
"substantial compensation" in directors' fees for serving
on the boards of several investment companies registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the
"Investment Company Act" or the "Act")2 with the same
investment adviser "call[ed] into question the director's
independence from the manager of that complex." 3 As a
result, Judge Sweet excused the plaintiff-shareholder from
making a demand on the Board of Directors of the Brazil
Fund, Inc., (the "Brazil Fund" or the "Fund")4 before filing
a derivative action challenging an offering by the Fund to
its shareholders of rights to buy more stock, which would
have had the collateral result of increasing the investment
adviser's asset-based fees because the sale of stock would
have increased the Fund's assets.
The reasoning of the court's decision in Strougo
implied that in any action affecting the investment
adviser's interests, directors receiving substantial
compensation (possibly as a result of serving on multiple
*James J. Hanks, Jr., is a partner in the Baltimore office of Ballard
Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, and an Adjunct Professor of Law at
Cornell Law School. Mr. Hanks is the author of MARYLAND CORPORATION
LAW (Supp. 1998).
'964 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), reargument denied (Aug.
18, 1997).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (1998).
3 Strougo, 964 F. Supp. at 795.
4 The Brazil Fund is a closed-end investment company advised by
Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc. See id. at 787 (noting that shares of the
Fund trade on the New York Stock Exchange).
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boards of commonly advised funds) would not be
disinterested and, thus, their decisions would be open to
attack under the standard of care for directors of Maryland
corporations set forth in section 2-405.1 of the Maryland
General Corporation Law (MGCL).5 Section 2-405.1(a) of
the MGCL requires that a director of a Maryland
corporation perform his duties: "(1) [i]n good faith; (2) [iun a
manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation; and (3) [with the care that an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances." 6 Section 2-405.1(a) was adopted by the
General Assembly of Maryland in 1976 and is derived,
almost word for word, from former section 8.30(a) of the
Model Business Corporation Act.7
The court also emphasized that because only one of
the directors did not serve on multiple commonly advised
boards, the Fund's board could not, under the MGCL,
appoint a committee of disinterested directors to consider
the plaintiff-shareholder's demand.8 The MGCL, at the
time of the relevant events, provided that the minimum
number of directors to constitute a board committee was
two. 9 Following Judge Sweet's decision, the same plaintiff
filed a very similar complaint on behalf of a different
closed-end fund, the Brazil Equity Fund, Inc., against its
directors and the same investment adviser, seeking to
5 MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-405.1 (1998).
6Id.
7 Section 8.30(a) of the Model Business Corporation Act was recently
amended. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model
Business Corporation Act Pertaining to the Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Liability for Directors-Final Adoption, 53 Bus. LAw. 813
(1998) (covering final adoption of certain amendments).
8 Strougo, 964 F. Supp. at 795.
9 Id. (stating that in Maryland, "two is the minimum number of
directors necessary to form a committee to consider a demand"). In
1996, section 2-41 1(a)(1) was amended to decrease that number to one.
See MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-411(a)(1) (1998). Judge Sweet
did not give any indication in his initial opinion or in his subsequent
opinion denying reargument and certification that he was aware of this
amendment to section 2-411 (a)(1).
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have demand excused in part due to the directors' service
on the boards of other commonly advised funds. i0
In August 1997, Judge Sweet denied reargument and
further observed that his earlier order had "concluded that
well-compensated service on multiple boards of funds
managed by a single fund advisor can, in some
circumstances, be indistinguishable in all relevant
respects from employment by the fund manager, which
admittedly renders a director interested."' I The judge also
denied certification of his interlocutory order to the Court
of Appeals of Maryland (the state's highest court) for a
definitive ruling on the issue that all the parties conceded
was solely an issue of Maryland law. 12
The Board of Directors of the Brazil Fund responded to
Strougo's suit by electing an additional director, a visiting
professor at the New York University business school with
a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard and prior experience at
Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan and the Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco, who did not serve on any other
boards of funds managed by the same investment adviser
and thus was disinterested as a matter of Maryland law,
even under Judge Sweet's ruling. 13 This new director,
together with the one director whom Judge Sweet
previously had identified as disinterested, was appointed
to serve as a special litigation committee of the Fund's
Board to review the allegations of the Strougo complaint. 14
The Fund sought and received a three-month stay of
action in Strougo in order to permit the special litigation
committee to complete its investigation.' 5 However, thejudge ordered that the stay should run from the date the
motion for stay was filed, which meant that the stay
1 Strougo v. Bassini, 1 F. Supp.2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
1 Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 2136(RWS),
1997 WL 473566, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1997).
12 Id. at *8.
13 See generally Strougo v. Padegs, 986 F. Supp. 812, 814-15(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing appointment of new director).
14 See id.
15 See id. at 815-16 (stating that three-month stay was reasonable
"ic]onsidering the complexity and seriousness of the allegations").
3
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expired on December 15, 1997.16 The special litigation
committee retained the New York City firm of Simpson
Thatcher & Bartlett as independent counsel to the
committee. 17
I. RATIONALE FOR
CORRECTIVE LEGISLATION
Because Maryland has for many years been the
favored jurisdiction for incorporation of mutual funds
throughout the country, Judge Sweet's decisions in May
and August 1997, roiled the investment company
industry.18 As a result, a drafting committee was formed
under the auspices of the Committee on Corporate Laws
(chaired by the author) of the Section of Business Law of
the Maryland State Bar Association. 19 By December 1997,
the drafting committee had concluded that corrective
legislation was necessary for several reasons.
First, the court's holding, if not reversed, would have
created tension between federal law and Maryland law.
The investment company industry is predominantly
organized in complexes - groups of funds offering
different investment objectives but managed by the same
investment adviser. Complexes generally employ a "pool"
or "cluster" board structure in which the same
independent directors serve on the boards of all or most of
the funds in the complex. These structures permit
1 See id. at 816.
17 Id. at 814.
18 Mutual funds are open-end investment companies. The Brazil Fund
and the Brazil Equity Fund are closed-end funds. However, the logic, or
lack thereof, of the court's decision applies equally to directors of open-
end funds as to directors of closed-end funds. Thus, this article is
written without regard for whether the situations described involve
directors of open-end funds, closed-end funds or a combination thereof.
19 Members of the drafting committee included: Larry Scriggins, Jay
Smith and Henry Kahn of Piper & Marbury, LLP; Lee Miller of Venable,
Baetjer and Howard; Dick Phillips and Jeff Maletta of Kirkpatrick &
Lockhart LLP; Henry Hopkins of T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.; Craig
Tyle of the Investment Company Institute; Will Rheiner and John Ake of
the Philadelphia office of Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP; and
the author.
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knowledgeable and efficient governance of the funds with
the independent directors' oversight mandated by the
rigorous requirements of the Investment Company Act.
The Act sets forth specific criteria for determining when a
director will be deemed an "interested person" of an
investment company. Service on the boards of multiple
funds with a common investment adviser and the receipt
of "substantial" compensation for this service are not
among these criteria. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), which administers the Investment
Company Act, has never determined that either service on
multiple boards or the receipt of "substantial"
compensation makes a director an interested person
under the Act. Because approximately 1,600 investment
companies registered under the Investment Company Act
are incorporated in Maryland, it is important that
Maryland law be consistent with federal law.
Second, there has never been any reason to believe
that directors of an investment company or any other
corporation are unable to act independently because they
receive compensation - even "substantial" compensation
- for their service on one or more boards. Directors are
responsible to shareholders, not to the investment adviser
of a fund complex or the management of an ordinary
corporation, and receipt of directors' fees has not been
held to taint the independence of directors of investment
companies or of corporations generally. Indeed, in Kamen
v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.,20 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, applying
Maryland law, held that receipt of directors' fees does not
mean that directors are not independent. 2'
20939 F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 1991).
21 1d. (rejecting plaintiffs argument that directors' fees meant
directors were under fund's "thumb" because -[i]f allegations of this
kind sufficed, the demand rule would be negated - for almost all
directors receive fees"); see also Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188
(Del. 1988) (directors' fees, "without more," do not affect directors'
independence); Parnes v. Balley Entertainment Corp., Del. Ch. C.A. No.
15192, slip op. (May 12, 1997) (directors' fees and pensions, without
more, do not imply that directors are not independent or disinterested).
5
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Third, under Judge Sweet's holding, investment
companies organized as Maryland corporations that share
a common investment adviser could be precluded from
having common independent directors. This would greatly
increase the number of persons needed to serve on mutual
fund boards, reducing the overall effectiveness and
efficiency of these boards and unnecessarily increasing
costs to shareholders with no resulting benefit. 22
Fourth, many Maryland-incorporated investment
companies operate multiple funds as separate series of
shares of the same corporation, with one board of directors
and one investment adviser, rather than as separate
corporations, each with its own board. No one has ever
objected to this structure as a matter of corporate
governance. If the management of several series can be
directed by one board of directors, there is no reason why
several corporations cannot be capably governed by
common boards.
Finally, under the judge's decision, boards composed
of individuals who serve as directors of more than one
mutual fund within the same complex would be
disqualified from making many determinations affecting
the investment adviser or other affdiates. 23 This, in turn,
would subject a board's judgments on numerous issues to
the threat of constant litigation and further undermine
effective governance of these companies. Virtually any
decision presented to the board of directors of an
investment company may have the effect of increasing the
22 Many issues addressed at a board of directors' meeting of one
mutual fund in a complex must also be addressed at the meetings of
other funds in the same complex. If each mutual fund in a complex
must have a separate set of independent directors, the costs of
educating each set of independent directors about the issues for which
it is responsible could be significant and would be paid by shareholders.
23 Disinterested directors of an investment company have responsibility
for oversight of transactions between the investment company and its
affiliates, including affiliates other than the investment adviser. See, e.g.,
Investment Company Act Rule 17a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-7 (1998).
Transactions with these other affiliates could als6 be challenged under the
reasoning in the court's decision.
6
Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vjlim/vol1/iss1/2
(VOL. 1:21 1999) STRAIGHTENING OUT STROUGO 27
company's assets and, therefore, the investment
adviser's fees.
II. NEW LEGISLATION
Accordingly, the drafting committee developed a one-
sentence bill, to add section 2-405.3 to the MGCL. The new
bill provided:
A director of a corporation that is an investment
company, as defined in the Investment Company Act
of 1940, who with respect to the investment company
is not an interested person, as defined in that Act,
shall be deemed to be independent and disinterested
when making any determination or taking any action
as a director.
Thus, the proposed new section 2-405.3 tied the
independence and disinterestedness of a director of a
Maryland-incorporated investment company to the
definition of "interested person" in the Investment
Company Act.24 No implication was intended that failure to
24 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1998). The statute defines "interested
person" as:
(19) "Interested person" of another person means:(A) when used with respect to an investment company:(i) any affiliated person of such company,(ii) any member of the immediate family of any natural
person who is an affiliated person of such company,(iii) any interested person of any investment adviser of or
principal underwriter for such company,(iv) any person or partner or employee of any person who
at any time since the beginning of the last two
completed fiscal years of such company has acted as
legal counsel for such company,(v) any broker or dealer registered under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or any affiliated person of such a
broker or dealer, and
7
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meet the "interested person" standard of that Act would
mean that a director of an investment company
incorporated in Maryland could not be independent or
disinterested.
(vi) any natural person whom the Commission by order
shall have determined to be an interested person by
reason of having had, at any time since the beginning
of the last two completed fiscal years of such company,
a material business or professional relationship with
such company or with the principal executive officer of
such company or with any other investment company
having the same investment adviser or principal
underwriter or with the principal executive officer of
such other investment company:
Provided, that no person shall be deemed to be an
interested person of an investment company solely by
reason of: (aa) his being a member of its board of
directors or advisory board or an owner of its
securities, or (bb) his membership in the immediate
family of any person specified in clause (aa) of this
proviso; and
(B) when used with respect to an investment adviser of or
principal underwriter for any investment company-
(i) any affiliated person of such investment adviser or
principal underwriter,
(ii) any member of the immediate family of any natural
person who is an affiliated person of such investment
adviser or principal underwriter,
(iii) any person who knowingly has any direct or indirect
beneficial interest in, or who is designated as trustee,
executor, or guardian of any legal interest in, any
security issued either by such investment adviser or
principal underwriter or by a controlling person of
such investment adviser or principal underwriter,
(iv) any person or partner or employee of any person who
at any time since the beginning of the last two
completed fiscal years of such investment company
has acted as legal counsel for such investment adviser
or principal underwriter,
(v) any broker or dealer registered under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or any affiliated person of such a
broker or dealer, and
8
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In early January 1998, the draft bill 25 was submitted
to the Maryland General Assembly's Legislative Reference
Service, which re-organized the proposed section 2-405.3
into two subsections:
(a) This section applies to a corporation that is an
investment company as defined by the Investment
Company Act of 1940.
(b) A director of a corporation who with respect to
the corporation is not an interested person, as defined
by the Investment Company Act of 1940, shall be
deemed to be independent and disinterested when
making any determination or taking any action as
a director.
(vi) any natural person whom the Commission by order
shall have determined to be an interested person by
reason of having had at any time since the beginning of
the last two completed fiscal years of such investment
company a material business or professional
relationship with such investment adviser or principal
underwriter or with the principal executive officer or
any controlling person of such investment adviser or
principal underwriter.
For the purpose of this paragraph (19), "member of the
immediate family" means any parent, spouse of a
parent, child, spouse of a child, spouse, brother or
sister, and includes step and adoptive relationships.
The Commission may modify or revoke any order
issued under clause (vi) of subparagraph (A) or (B) of
this paragraph whenever it finds that such order is no
longer consistent with the facts. No order issued
pursuant to clause (vi) of subparagraph (A) or (B) of
this paragraph shall become effective until at least
sixty days after the entry thereof, and no such order
shall affect the status of any person for the purposes of
this subchapter or for any other purpose for any period
prior to the effective date of such order.
25 The draft bill was sponsored by Delegate Robert L. Frank (Baltimore
County), who had sponsored many corporate bills for the Maryland
State Bar Association (MSBA) over the first three years of his service in
the House of Delegates of the General Assembly, and Delegate Anne
Marie Doory (Baltimore City). The Council of the Section of Business
Law of the MSBA also approved the bill.
9
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III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MARYLAND HOUSE
OF DELEGATES
A. INTRODUCTION AND HEARING
On January 30, 1998, this legislation was introduced
in the House of Delegates as House Bill 356 ("H.B. 356" or
the "Bill") and was assigned to the House Economic
Matters Committee. 26  On February 19, 1998, the
Committee held a hearing on the Bill. 27 Henry Hopkins of
T. Rowe Price & Associates, Inc., Bryson Popham,
representing the Maryland Securities Association, and the
author, on behalf of the MSBA, testified at the hearing in
support of the Bill. BT Alex. Brown, Inc. and Legg Mason,
Inc. also sent letters in support. No one appeared in
opposition to the Bill.
After the February 19 hearing, an amendment was
proposed 28 providing that the Bill "shall be construed
retroactively and shall be applied to and interpreted to
affect only those cases filed on or after January 30, 1998."
26 The House Economic Matters Committee was chaired by Delegate
Michael E. Busch (Anne Arundel County).
27 Shortly before the hearing, Dean Mark A. Sargent of Villanova
University School of Law, formerly Chair of the MSBA Committee on
Corporate Laws, sent a letter to the House Committee strongly
criticizing Judge Sweet's decisions and supporting enactment of the
Bill. In pertinent part the letter stated:
Judge Sweet's holding that disinterested directors of commonly-
advised investment companies may not be independent for
purposes of considering an action that may increase the net assets
and, therefore, the asset-based fees of the funds' advisers, is
contrary to federal law on the subject and is unprecedented as a
matter of state law....
In my opinion, Judge Sweet's decision is wrong as a matter of
Maryland law, as its extremely stringent conception of directors'
independence is not based on any Maryland authority. It is also
wrong as a matter of public policy. If not corrected promptly, it
could be applied to an almost limitless number of board decisions,
resulting in either sharply increased costs of administration or an
industry-wide flight from Maryland.
Letter from Mark A. Sargent, Dean of the University of Villanova School
of Law, to The Honorable Michael Busch, Chairman, House Economic
Matters Committee (Feb. 16, 1998) (on file with the ViUanova Journal of
Law and Investment Management).
28 Delegate Michael R. Gordon (Montgomery County), Vice-Chairman
of the House Economic Matters Committee, proposed the amendment.
10
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The proposed date (the date the Bill was introduced) was a
compromise - it did not affect pending litigation, but it did
close the potential window of opportunity for new suits to
be filed before the customary effective date of October 1 for
Maryland legislation. Proponents of the Bill acquiesced in
the amendment.
B. OPPOSITION
Shortly thereafter, the first opposition to the Bill
emerged. 29 The first salvo was a one-page document,
30
which made several fallacious arguments that were often
repeated.
One of the opposition arguments was that H.B. 356
would somehow limit the power of the shareholders of a
Maryland corporation to bring a derivative suit. Nothing in
29 The single opponent to the Bill was a plaintiffs' securities lawyer in
Montgomery County.3 0 See Statement in Opposition to HB 356 (on file with the Villanova
Journal of Law and Investment Management). The document contained
the following points (as stated in the document - underlining replaced
here with italics).
1. House Bill 356 seeks to create a special exception in Maryland law
for investment companies ONLY - not available to any other
Maryland Corporation.
2. The bill is the result of the finding in the Strougo case where
Maryland law was applied and the Court found that there may not
be two "disinterested Directors" (as required by Maryland law) and
therefore did not dismiss the lawsuit brought by stockholders. The
"disinterested" directors in the Strougo case were being paid
$81,000 and $132,000 respectively for service on the Boards of 8
and 14 separate funds managed by Scudder, the investment
company against which the action was brought. The mutual fund
industry did not like the result of Strougo and therefore has
introduced House Bill 356.
11
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the Bill, of course, eliminated or diminished the right of
shareholders to bring a derivative action. It simply adopted
the standard of the Investment Company Act regarding
who is an "interested person" in a decision by the board of
directors of an investment company incorporated in
Maryland. Shareholders of investment companies retain
the full right to file suits on behalf of investment
companies. Moreover, since 188 1, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has required that a shareholder who brings a
derivative action must first make demand upon the
corporation to sue in its own name and the demand must
be refused.3 1 The reason for the demand requirement is
because a derivative suit, in the words of the Court of
Appeals, "is a matter for the corporate authorities
themselves [that is, the board of directors], and not for the
stockholders to determine .... -32 In fact, Maryland
shareholders have substantially greater rights to bring
derivative suits than shareholders in many other states
3. Since 1881, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has permitted
stockholders to bring a derivative action on behalf of the company
if they believe that the Board of Directors has been engaged in self-
dealing or breached its fiduciary duties to the corporation.
4. House Bill 356 seeks to prevent stockholders from bringing such
an action directly before the Court if they believe that the Board of
Directors is not "disinterested" and is engaging in self-dealing.
5. The last serious attempt to undermine these rules occurred in the
mid- 1960s. The Court of Appeals of Maryland soundly rejected the
suggestion that the protections of Maryland law be weakened and
stockholders be forbidden from asking a judge to look at their
claims.
6. The Courts in Maryland have not had difficulty applying Maryland
law to mutual funds and other companies. No segment of the
legitimate business community has been hurt by a judge's ability
to consider claims of fraud, waste or mismanagement. There is no
reason to change Maryland law.
7. The Security (sic) and Exchange Commission (SEC) was asked by
the Investment Company Institute to take industry's side in
Strougo but the SEC refused to do so. Only the party that lost in
the case thinks the judge was wrong.
8. HB 356 weakens the State's ability to protect investor's interests
and does not better the mutual fund industry.
31 Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419, 439 (1881).
32 Davis v. Gemmell, 70 Md. 356, 376 (1889).
12
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because Maryland retains the futility exception to the
demand requirement.33
Another opposition argument was that H.B. 356 would
weaken the ability of the State of Maryland to protect the
interests of fund shareholders. This argument overlooked
the fact that protection of investors in funds has
historically been primarily the responsibility of the SEC,-
4
which has never adopted Judge Sweet's position. The
MGCL, however, is the responsibility of the General
Assembly of Maryland. For several decades the Maryland
legislature has adopted reasonable and responsible
legislation concerning the governance of investment
companies formed in Maryland.35
3 3 The futility exception excuses the requirement of demand on the
board before a derivative action is brought. See, e.g., ALl PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.03 (1994) (explaining that "[w]hat
constitutes futility varies among jurisdictions"). In Maryland, however,
the exception has been construed very narrowly. For example, in
Kamen, the court held that under Maryland law, "a demand is 'futile'
only if the directors' minds are closed to argument." Kamen, 939 F.2d at
462. Moreover, both The American Law Institute and the Model
Business Corporation Act have eliminated the futility exception and
have adopted a requirement of demand in all cases, subject only to a
limited exception for irreparable harm to the corporation. See ALl
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.03 (1994); REVISED MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 7.42 (1998). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a
recent landmark case, specifically adopted the universal demand rule of
the ALl. Cuker v. Mikalauskas, 692 A.2d 1042, 1049 (Pa. 1997).
34 As noted above, the SEC administers the Investment Company Act.
The Act provides numerous protections for fund shareholders. See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-12 & 80a-17 (1998). The Act does not, however,
preclude the application of state corporate law to funds incorporated in
a particular state.
35 One of the early reasons why many investment companies formed
in Maryland was that Maryland law permitted redemption of shares of
common stock. See MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2- 105(a)(5) (1998).
The Maryland legislature has also enacted many statutes specifically for
investment companies, including unilateral redemption of small
accounts, see id. at § 2-310. 1, exemption from annual meetings, see id.
at § 2-501 (b), and power to make certain charter amendments without
stockholder approval, see id. at § 2-605(a)(4). For further discussion,
see Mark A. Sargent, Maryland's Leadership in the Law of Business
Organizations, MD. B.J. (Jan./Feb. 1997), at 15, 17-18. In addition,
there are many generally applicable features of the MGCL that are
attractive to investment companies, including the absence of any
franchise tax.
13
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C. PASSAGE BY THE HOUSE
After a favorable report from a specially constituted
work group,3 6 the House Economic Matters Committee
voted on March 24, 1998, to give a favorable report to H.B.
356. 37 Three days later, H.B. 356 was passed by the House
of Delegates by a vote of 83-36. The three dozen votes
against the Bill in the House indicated that there could be
serious opposition to the Bill in the Senate of Maryland.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MARYLAND SENATE
A. OPPOSITION ARGUMENTS
In the Senate, the Bill was referred to the Committee
on Judicial Proceedings.3 8 On April 3, 1998, the opponent
sent a letter to the chairman of that committee that was
filled with various incorrect and irrelevant statements. For
example, the letter asserted that the proponents of the Bill
were wrong when they claimed that Judge Sweet's decision
"misstates Maryland law."39 To support its assertion .the
letter then cited several cases establishing the demand
requirement and the futility exception in derivative
proceedings - issues that were totally beside the point of
Judge Sweet's decision.
The letter also challenged the claim that compensation
for service as a director does not taint a director's
independence by citing several cases involving some form
of compensation or some relationship other than directors'
fees. In addition, the letter miscited an article in The New
36 Chairman Busch appointed a "work group," chaired by Delegate
Michael A. Crumlin (Prince George's County), to review H.B. 356 and all
other pending legislation relating to corporations and other forms of
business entities.
37The vote was 16 in favor, three opposed, with one abstention and
one absent.
38The Senate Committee on Judicial Proceedings was chaired by
Senator Walter M. Baker (Cecil County), one of the most senior and
respected members of the Senate.
39 Letter from Ronald B. Rubin to The Honorable Walter M. Baker,
Chairman, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (April 3, 1998) (on
file with the Villanova Journal of Law and Investment Management).
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York Law Journal, co-authored by Dennis J. Block, 40 for
the proposition, as stated in the letter, that directors "who
receive substantial payments for these services" are not
"independent."4 1 In fact, Mr. Block in the then-current
edition of his celebrated treatise, The Business Judgment
Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors, specifically
states that demand is not excused merely because directors
"[r]eceive compensation for service as directors .... 42
Most egregiously, however, the letter claimed that H.B.
356 would "insulate the actions of a mutual fund's Board
of Directors from any judicial scrutiny."43 There was no
acknowledgment of the fundamental distinction that the
Bill was not aimed at derivative suits but only at the
narrow issue addressed by Judge Sweet - the
disinterestedness of investment company directors who
receive "substantial compensation" for serving on multiple
boards of commonly advised investment companies.
B. HEARING
On April 6, 1998, a hearing regarding H.B. 356 was
held before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee. 44
Testimony offered in opposition to the Bill included several
inflammatory and irrelevant comments. 45 It referred to the
"futility demand" cases in Maryland, apparently meaning
40 D.J. Block & J.M. Hoff, Corporate Governance and Independent
Directors, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, July 21, 1994, at 5.
41 Letter from Ronald B. Rubin to The Honorable Walter M. Baker,
supra note 39.
42 DENNIS J. BLOCK, ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGEMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 756, 759 (Supp. 1995).4 3Letter from Ronald B. Rubin to The Honorable Walter M. Baker,
supra note 39.
44Although it is the tradition of the Committee not to invite witnesses
other than the sponsor to testify on bills already passed by the House of
Delegates, Senator Baker asked the author of this article and the
opponent's representative to testify before his Committee on H.B. 356.
45The author testified first, so he did not have an opportunity at the
time to rebut the inaccurate statements made in opposition to the Bill.
The author did submit a letter after the hearing responding to the
erroneous points in that testimony. Letter from James J. Hanks to The
Honorable Walter M. Baker, Chairman, Committee on Judicial
Proceedings (April 8, 1998) (on file with the Villanova Journal of Law
and Investment Manqgement). The discussion of the testimony in
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cases establishing the futility exception to the demand
requirement in derivative suits, none of which were
affected by H.B. 356. It also repeatedly referred to
"stacking of fees" and "stacking of directorships," despite
the fact that Judge Sweet's point in the Strougo case was
not the number of directorships but the amount of
compensation involved. More to the point, the testimony in
opposition not only ignored cases holding that the
compensation paid to directors does not affect their
independence but also noticeably failed to cite a single
case holding that the amount of compensation paid to
directors does taint their independence. 46
The testimony also stated that "Maryland law requires
two disinterested directors" to approve dismissal of a
derivative suit. There is no such law. Perhaps the
testimony was referring to Judge Sweet's reference to the
two-director requirement for members of committees of the
board of directors of Maryland corporations. As noted
above, after the events giving rise to the Strougo case, the
General Assembly, following Delaware and many other
states, amended the MGCL to decrease the minimum
number of directors for board committees from two to
one.
4 7
C. UNFAVORABLE REPORT, AMENDMENT, ENACTMENT
The Judicial Proceedings Committee on April 9, 1998,
gave an unfavorable report to H.B. 356 by a vote of eight to
three. The fact that two other corporate law bills heard the
same day were also given unfavorable reports suggests
that the unfavorable report of H.B. 356 was based on the
end-of-the-session crush of bills or other considerations
not relating to the merits of the bills.
The proponents of H.B. 356 were discouraged but not
deterred by the unfavorable report in the Senate Judicial
opposition to the Bill is based on the letter from the author to Chairman
Baker, rather than a copy of the testimony.
46 For a discussion of cases holding that the compensation paid to
directors does not affect their independence, see supra note 2 1.
47 See supra note 9.
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Proceedings Committee. 48 During the last few days of the
1998 session, the substance of H.B. 356 was amended
onto another bill, S.B. 468 (which had already passed the
Senate), on the floor of the House of Delegates with the
help of members of the House Economic Matters
Committee. 49 Debate on the House floor was particularly
lively but after a delegate5 ° stood up and announced that
Maryland investment companies would consider
reincorporating in other states if S.B. 468 failed, S.B. 468
passed the House by a vote of 113 to 10, giving the
amended S.B. 468 thirty more favorable votes than H.B.
356 on final passage in the House. After passing the
House, the bill was sent back to the Senate, which
concurred with the House amendment to the bill by a vote
of 27 to 19 on April 12, the final day of the 1998 legislative
session. 1
Senate Bill 468 was signed by Governor Parris N.
Glendening on May 12, 1998, as Chapter 397 of the Laws
of Maryland (1998), and became effective on October 1,
1998. On November 3, 1998 most of the Maryland State
Senators and Delegates responsible for straightening out
Strougo were reelected. The sponsor of H.B. 356 was not,
however, on the ballot. He had lost in the Democratic
primary election in September.52
48 Strong support for the Bill was provided by George Roche and
Henry Hopkins of T. Rowe Price and Associates, Inc.; Bryson Popham
and John Stierhoff, representing the Maryland Securities Association;
and Paul Tiburzi of Piper & Marbury, aiding the author's efforts in
representing the MSBA.49 Chairman Busch and Delegate Crumlin were particularly helpful.
50 Delegate Crumlin.
51 Senator Thomas V. Mike Miller, Jr. (Prince George's County),
President of the Senate, and Chairman Baker aided in passage of the
amended Senate bill.
52 In the quadrennial elections for the General Assembly in November,
1998, Senate President Miller, Senator Baker, Delegate Busch and
Delegate Gordon were easily re-elected. Delegate Crumlin did not run
for re-election. Delegate Frank, the sponsor and tireless worker for H.B.
356, was defeated in the Democratic primary election in September,
1998, by 96 votes.
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V. MEANWHILE, BACK AT THE COURTHOUSE
While the legislative wheels were beginning to turn in
Maryland, on January 7, 1998, defendants in the original
Strougo suit filed a motion to dismiss based on the
recommendation of the two-director special litigation
committee.
On May 27, 1998, the same day that the House of
Delegates gave final approval to H.B. 356, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland decided Wittman v. Crooke.53
The court held that the possibility of serving on the board
of directors of an acquiring corporation does not violate the
duties of the directors of the target corporation in
approving a merger with the acquiring corporation. 54
Wittman arose out of the proposed merger between
Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (BG&E) and Potomac
Electric Power Company.5 5 The plaintiff, a shareholder in
BG&E, alleged that the BG&E directors were prohibited
from recommending the merger because each director
might be elected to the board of the successor. 56 The court
held that the possibility that one or more members of the
board of directors of an acquired corporation might be
elected as directors of the acquiring corporation is not
"sufficient to cause the kind of conflict of interest that
cannot be ratified by the shareholders. ' 57 Likewise, the
adoption of employment contracts for the directors and the
CEO did not create a non-ratifiable conflict.5 8 This ruling of
the Court of Special Appeals strongly reinforced the
position taken by the proponents of H.B. 356.
53 707 A.2d 422 (1998).
54 See id. at 425 ("We reject appellant's argument that the opportunity
for a position on the board of directors of the new corporation is
sufficient to cause the kind of conflict of interest that cannot be ratified
by the shareholders.").55 Id. at 423.56 Id. at 425.57 Id.
58 See id. Unfortunately, the court repeated the mistake of earlier
decisions in holding that section 2-419, the interested director statute
of the MGCL, could be "violated." The court also erroneously analyzed
the BG&E directors' duties under the business judgment rule, which
has largely been superseded by section 2-405.1 of the MGCL. See
James J. Hanks, Jr., Maryland Corporation Law § 6.8 (Aspen Law and
Business Supp. 1998).
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On April 6, 1998, the same day as the hearing before
the Senate Committee, Judge Sweet denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss the original Strougo
complaint against the Brazil Fund.5 9 The judge ruled that,
although the issue had not been decided by a Maryland
court, Maryland would apply the standard established by
the Supreme Court of Delaware in Zapata v. Maldonado°
and (a) impose on the corporation the burden of proving
that the board committee recommending dismissal of a
derivative action was independent, acted in good faith and
had a reasonable basis for its recommendation and (b)
permit the court to apply its own business judgment to the
committee's recommendation. 61 Although Judge Sweet
noted that the Brazil Fund "has met its primafacie burden
of proof with respect to the Zapata standard,- 62 he
permitted further discovery by the plaintiff, including
inspection of the 30 boxes of documents made available to
the special litigation committee, inspection of the notes of
interviews by the committee and drafts of the committee's
report and deposition of the members of the committee -
just the sort of fishing expedition that the universal
demand rule is designed to avoid.
On that same day, Judge Sweet also denied a motion
to dismiss the derivative action claims in the suit against
the Brazil Equity Fund on the ground that Strougo had
established futility of demand because of the receipt of fees
(less in aggregate amount than in Strougo's first action) by
directors from multiple commonly advised funds.63
In late November, 1998, Judge Sweet dismissed the
remaining claims brought by Strougo and his suit against
the Brazil Fund.64 The dismissal was based on the
determination by the special litigation committee that
continuation of the action was not in the best interests of
59 Strougo v. Padegs, 1 F. Supp.2d 276, 282 (S.D. N.Y. 1998) (stating
that motion to dismiss is denied and additional discovery is permitted).
60430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
61 Strougo v. Padegs, 1 F. Supp.2d 276, 280-281 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
62 Id. at 282.
63 Strougo v. Bassini, I F. Supp.2d 268, 273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
4 Strougo v. Padegs, No. 96 Civ.2136(RWS), 1998 WL 805038, *16
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1998).
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the Fund or its shareholders. Judge Sweet determined that
both members of the committee were independent and
rejected the argument that bias due to the independent
directors' relationship to the other directors tainted the
committee's independence. The court then found that the
committee had reached its conclusions in good faith,
independently and with a reasonable basis, thus satisfying
the first requirement of the Zapata standard of review.
Applying the second requirement of the Zapata standard
- application by the court of its own business judgment -
the court found that Strougo's claim that the directors and
the Fund's investment manager had breached their duties
was unlikely to succeed, that there was no proof of
damages to the Fund from the rights offering and that
Strougo's claims did not merit further consideration.
VI. EPILOGUE
On December 4, 1998, Massachusetts Governor Paul
Celluci signed Senate Bill 2079, the Massachusetts
Prudent Investor Act, providing, among other things, that
a trustee of a trust registered under the Investment
Company Act as an investment company with the SEC
who "is not an interested person, as defined in said
Investment Company Act of 1940, shall be deemed to be
independent and disinterested when making any
determination or taking any action as a trustee."65 The
Massachusetts legislation adopted almost the exact words
of H.B. 356.
Finally, by the Fall of 1998, at least five suits had been
brought against various funds and advisers challenging
the independence of directors serving on multiple boards
of commonly advised mutual funds under the Investment
Company Act itself, rather than under state law.66
65 1998 Mass. Laws ch. 398, § 2A.
66 Carol Carangelo, Common Boards Targeted at Prudential and
Fidelity, FUND DIREcIONS (Oct. 1998). One of the two co-counsel in all
five suits was the sole opponent to H.B. 356.
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